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Abstract 
 
EMU is, to a large extent, the result of a process of Franco-German reconciliation and 
understanding.  However, in the postwar period, there were significant differences in ideas 
and economic policy-making in Germany and France.  France was dominated by the 
"tradition républicaine", giving a central role to the state in economic life.  In Germany, the 
federal structure of the state went together with the social market economy.  In this paper 
an analysis is presented of these differences in thought and economic policy-making, how 
they evolved through time, and how they contributed to shaping the nature and form of the 
European Union.  The focus is on the Rome Treaties, the Werner Report and the 
Maastricht Treaty process. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Franco-German debates on European monetary integration are widely known as the 
controversy between the "monetarists" and the "economists".   The "monetarists", with 
France as a dominant player, were in favour of plans for greater exchange rate stability 
and exchange rate support mechanisms.  They saw a driving role for monetary integration 
in the process of  European  integration.  The "economists", under the leadership of 
Germany, emphasised the coordination of economic policies and the convergence of 
economic performances, especially inflation, as a precondition for EMU.  According to their 
view, the so-called coronation theory, monetary union could only be the last and crowning 
phase in the process of economic integration
1. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the underlying paradigms behind these 
controversies.  A useful starting point is Tinbergen's view of economic integration as 
concerning the regulation of international relations.  As such, economic integration is in 
essence a question of the organisation of economic policy.  A crucial question is the 
degree of centralisation: "Which functions in international economic life should be subject 
to central control and which should be left to individual countries, enterprises or persons?" 
(Tinbergen, 1954, 98).  The answer to this question depends largely on two elements: the 
view on the role of the state in the economy and the view on European integration.  
Moreover, it is important to look at, even more deeply situated, "meta-cultural" beliefs, 
which are related to fundamental constitutional issues as the design and functioning of the 
state and its legitimacy.  These meta-cultural beliefs largely influence the views on 
economic policy and European integration. 
 
The focus of this paper is strongly on the role of ideas i n the process of European 
integration.  This does certainly not imply that power issues were not important.  On the 
contrary, any transfer of sovereignty has profound consequences for power relations, both 
between and inside countries.  Crucial power issues in the Franco-German EMU debates 
were the German sovereignty in the field of monetary policy (and the de facto 
determination of the orientation of monetary policy in the EMS by the Bundesbank), and 
the granting of independence to the Banque de France, a profound change in French 
society. 
 
                                                             
1   Naturally, EMU is not an exclusive Franco-German matter.  See, for instance, Maes & Quaglia, 2002, for an analysis of 
the Belgian and Italian approaches and contributions.  
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Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that the crucial proposals for European monetary 
integration were Franco-German political initiatives at the highest level: the Brandt-
Pompidou proposal at the Hague, the European Monetary System by Giscard and 
Schmidt, and the Maastricht Treaty process with Kohl and Mitterrand.  The technical 
monetary experts were rather more reserved. 
 
The paper starts with a presentation of the main lines of thought and economic policy-
making in France and Germany.  Thereafter, the focus is on three important stages in the 
development of the European Union: the Rome Treaties, the Werner Report and the 
relaunching of the monetary union process in the second half of the 1980s.  The paper 
ends with the agreement on the Maastricht Treaty
2. 
 
2.  MAIN LINES OF THOUGHT AND ECONOMIC POLICY-MAKING IN 
GERMANY AND FRANCE 
 
In the post-war period, there were some significant differences in economic ideas among 
policy-makers in Germany and France.  These were based on fundamental characteristics 
of their history and society.  The analysis will focus on three levels, which are strongly 
interrelated: (1) meta-cultural beliefs, (2) views on economic policy-making, and (3) views 
on European integration
3. 
 
2.1.  France: the "tradition républicaine" and a centralisation of power 
 
France had a long tradition of a strong central state.  As remarked by Rosanvallon (1992, 
64), the "State" preceded the nation in France, and gave France a coherence and an 
identity
4.  An important element of the central state was the creation of a strong national 
elite, formed in the "Grandes Ecoles" (Ecole Polytechnique, Ecole Nationale de 
l'Administration, ...).  The graduates of these "Grandes Ecoles" move quite easily between 
the public and the private sector. 
 
                                                             
2  It is not the purpose of this paper to make an assessment of the functioning and legitimacy of EMU (or the relation with 
political union).  See  Eijffinger and de Haan, 2000,  Hodson and Maher, 2001, Issing, 1999, Padoa-Schioppa, 2001, 
Quaden, 2000, Verdun and Christiansen, 2000 and Wessels and Linsenmann, 2001.  Also, this paper will not go into the 
issue of optimum currency area theory, see Mongelli, 2002. 
3  The analysis will be restricted to the main lines for views on European integration, especially the functions which should 
be exercised at the European level and the nature of the European institutions, supranational or intergovernmental. 
4  According to legal experts, the French civil law system was designed to be an instrument of power of the state.  This 
contrasts with the Anglo-Saxon civil law system where the protection of the citizens against the government is at the 
core.  
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The Revolution of 1789 abolished the monarchy and reduced the role of religion, placing 
"Reason" at the center of French society.  This further reinforced the role of the state in 
French society
5.  It gave birth to "la tradition républicaine", focused on the "one and 
indivisible" republic, a view which would permeate France.  Fundamental to the republican 
state was the primacy attached to the sovereign nation as the source of legitimacy.  The 
task of the state was to ensure the unity of public power in the service of the nation
6. 
 
The "tradition républicaine" stressed also the political direction of policy (Howarth, 1999).  
It implied the primacy of political will on the markets.  Economic policy had then a strongly 
"voluntarist" element.  The republican tradition legitimated a centralisation of power, also in 
the area of economic and monetary matters.  So was the Banque de France considered as 
a part of the "circuit du Trésor", a far cry from an independent central bank
7. 
 
There was further a long tradition of state intervention in economic life in France, famous 
with Colbertism and the establishment of the "manufactures royales".  This came to the 
foreground in the role of the state in industrial policy (like already in Colbertism) and the 
importance of planning in the postwar period. 
 
In France "Le Plan" and the Planning Office would play a crucial role in the post-war 
reconstruction.  Post-war planning was instaured by an ordonnance of De Gaulle of 
January 1946.  Jean Monnet was the first Commissioner of the Planning Office.  The 
purpose was to mobilise resources in order to modernise France.  As such, it fitted into the 
French centralist tradition.  Moreover, the French felt that the weakness of their steel 
sector was an important reason for their defeat in 1940.  This was a further factor in favour 
of a more planned modernisation of the country. 
 
In essence, the plan was a strategy around a medium-term framework, which provided an 
orientation to the economic actors, reducing so uncertainty.  It aimed at creating 
coherence, introducing "un élément souhaitable de rationalité" (Marjolin, 1963, 18), a key 
concept of the Republican tradition.  Important was further the sectoral approach, which 
aimed at identifying sectors where bottlenecks would occur, which could then be 
eliminated.  The Plan was so at the heart of the French industrial strategy.  French 
                                                             
5  So took the state an important role in education, which in France is called "éducation nationale". 
6   It went together with a French emphasis  on  institutions, something which was very typical of Monnet's approach to 
European integration: "Rien n'est possible sans les hommes, rien n'est durable sans les institutions" (Monnet, 1976, 412.  
See also Fontaine, 1990, 19 or Duchêne, 1994, 401). 
7  In an article of 1992, Christian Noyer, then at the French Treasury, wrote about central bank independance as 
"l'exception au principe démocratique" (Noyer, 1992, 17).  
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programmation was also "voluntarist" (Massé, 1963, 45).  It aimed both at a somewhat 
higher expansion than would be realised by the spontaneous working of market forces, 
and at correcting certain imbalances of the market mechanism. 
 
Planning was in line with the engineering tradition in economic thought in France.  This 
tradition was especially strong among the graduates of the "Grandes Ecoles", civil 
servants and top managers (Schmidt, 2000, 129).  Moreover, there was a relatively strong 
influence of Keynesian economics at the French Planning Office (Rosanvallon, 1987, 40).  
A special example was Robert Marjolin, the Deputy Commissioner of the Plan and one of 
France's first prominent Keynesians (Arena and Schmidt, 1999)
8.  However, the Plan had 
much less influence at the powerful Finance Ministry, which had a more pragmatic attitude. 
 
It is less easy to distinguish clear tendencies or schools of thought with respect to 
macroeconomic and monetary policy in France during the postwar period.  All the major 
parties pursued, during their terms in office, quite diverse economic policies.  Moreover, 
several persons favoured different kind of policies at different moments of time.   
 
Basically, one could argue, that there was a tension between two approaches: one 
focusing on domestic policy priorities, especially economic growth, and taking a more 
relaxed view of the exchange rate, the other advocating "discipline" and in favour of a 
stable (or strong) French franc.  The first tendency, focusing on domestic policy objectives, 
was more in line with the traditional French "voluntarist" approach.  It drew support from 
different quarters, both in socialist and gaullist milieu's, as well as among employers and 
trade unions.  The main objective of economic policy was to stimulate economic activity, 
even at the cost of a higher rate of inflation.  Ensuing competitiveness problems were 
mainly tackled by devaluations of the franc.  This line of thought dominated during the 
Pompidou presidency (1969-1974), the Chirac prime ministership (1974-1976) and the first 
years of the Mitterrand presidency (1981-1983).  It could draw on support from more 
pragmatic Keynesians and left-wing economists.  On the other hand there was the more 
"orthodox" line, emphasising discipline: a strong French franc, wage moderation and 
sound public finances.  It could be characterised as the line "Rueff-Barre-Delors".  It 
dominated French policy-making during the presidency of De Gaulle (1958-1969), with the 
Rueff-Pinay stabilisation plan, during the Barre prime ministership (1976-1981) and after 
Mitterrand's decision to stay in the EMS in March 1983.  Traditionally, this line was more 
supported by liberal, free market oriented economists.  This "orthodox" line was, generally, 
                                                             
8   In the postwar period left-wing ideas, partly Marxian inspired, were quite influential in France.  
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also the more pro-European line.  The control of inflation in the 1960s made it possible for 
France to participate in the creation of the common market
9.  The European Monetary 
System was created during the Barre prime ministership.  European motives were crucial 
for Mitterrand to stay in the EMS.  Generally, the European constraint was influential in 
pushing through more orthodox economic policies, while a strong franc (with sound 
fundamentals) was important to be a strong and solid partner in the European debate
10. 
 
Chart 1 - Exchange rate of the french franc against the german mark 
 
 
 
    Regarding views on European integration, the republican tradition, 
emphasising the "one and indivisible" state, made French policy-makers generally more 
reluctant to transfer sovereignty to the European level.  Moreover, they were in favour of 
an intergovernmental approach. 
 
2.2.  Germany: a federalist approach with a division of power
11 
 
In Germany, Nazism and the second world war marked a fundamental break with the past.  
Nazism had shown the dangers of a centralisation of power.  This centralisation was also 
evident in the economic field.  National socialism had, step by step, introduced a centrally 
                                                             
9  During the Rome Treaty negotiations, the French negotiators were very concerned about France's competitiveness and 
insisted on safeguard clauses.  However, for de Gaulle, the European Community and the competition which it entailed, 
was important to push for the modernisation of France's economy. 
10  Naturally, during the 1960s, currency issues were mainly international monetary issues, in the framework of the Bretton-
Woods system.  For De Gaulle a strong French franc was very much a symbol of a strong France. 
11   The word "federalism" is here used in a "continental" sense (especially application of the subsidiarity principle) and not a 
"British" one (transferring power to Europe).  
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administered economy.  The central bank became known as the "specialised printing 
office" of the government.  
 
A crucial element of the new economic and political system in postwar Germany was 
"decentralisation".  This was a reaction against the centralisation of national socialism.  It 
was also  the result of  very strong American influences in the reconstruction of West 
Germany (federal State, federal central banking system, anti cartel policy, ...). 
 
Decentralisation not only applied to the political organisation of the country, such as the 
federal structure of the state.  It was also a basic principle of the organisation of economic 
policy.  So was the central bank responsible for monetary policy, but not for banking 
supervision.  The market economy itself is a decentralised structure, which goes together 
with Germany's federal state (Molitor, 1980, 838). 
 
Germany's economic system in the postwar period can best be characterised as a "social 
market economy", a phrase coined by Alfred Müller-Armack, a professor at the University 
of Köln and State Secretary of Erhard at the Economics ministry.  He conceived the social 
market economy as combining the principle of freedom in the market with that of social 
balance.  In contrast to "laissez-faire" capitalism, the concept of the social market economy 
requires above all a clear legal and political regulatory framework, or "Ordnungsrahmen"  
(Tietmeyer, 1999, 6). 
 
During the war, "ordo-liberal" ideas were  developed  by a number of economists in 
Germany, known as the Freiburg School
12.  They became very influential in the postwar 
period.  Ludwig Erhard, the first Economics minister, and an economics professor himself, 
was very much influenced by them.  These ordo-liberal ideas were an important source of 
inspiration for the economic reforms of June 1948, with which the market economy was 
restored. 
 
When trying to understand the development of economic thought it is helpful to focus on 
important historical events.  After the war, the reconstruction and recovery of the economy 
on the European continent was such a crucial event.  However, the experiences of France 
and Germany were different, contributing to different economic paradigms.  In France, the 
recovery was strongly associated with "Le Plan".  In Germany, the recovery, "Das 
                                                             
12  For an analysis of postwar German economic thought, see Hagemann, 2000, Klump, 1997, Rieter & Schmolz, 1993, 
Schefold, 1998 and Watrin, 1979.  
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Wirtschaftswunder" (the economic miracle), was associated with the return of the free 
market economy. 
 
The ordo-liberal economists emphasised that economic policy was, in essence, 
"Ordnungspolitik", i.e. a policy to create a sound and secure framework w ithin which 
markets can operate.  As such, they laid great emphasis on the interdependence between 
the economic order and all other forms of order (i.e. legal, social and political).  The main 
tasks of economic policy are : (a) monetary policy: assure price stability; (b) fiscal policy: 
rather limited task for the government; and (c) structural policy: a more passive role, 
competition policy is emphasised. 
 
In its emphasis on historical and institutional aspects of economic problems, the ordo-
liberal approach drew to a significant extent on the ideas and approach of the historical 
school (Hutchison, 1979, 435).  Moreover, prominent members of the Freiburg school (e.g. 
Böhm) were jurists, contributing further to the emphasis on the economic order. 
 
The decisive social element, in the opinion of Erhard and Müller-Armack, is the freedom 
with which the market economy is associated (Tietmeyer, 1999, 6).  Competition is 
herefore very important, as it limits the exercise of economic and social power.  The social 
market economy also encompasses supplementary social provisions and safety nets, 
provided that they are consistent with market principles.  The social market economy 
should then not be considered as a "third way", but is clearly a market economic system. 
 
According to the advocates of the social market economy, a strong state is necessary, but 
one with limited functions.  The main role of the state is to set the framework conditions, as 
these are decisive for the development of economic activity.  The fundamental task of the 
state is "rule-setting": to set the rules for economic processes, monitor compliance with 
them, and punish infringements.  The aim of these rules is to set a framework that permits 
the highest possible degree of freedom and ensures lasting  maintenance of effective 
competition.  Important elements are clearly defined property rights and an active 
competition policy
13. 
 
A constitutive element of the social market economy is monetary stability (Tietmeyer, 
1999, 138).  Monetary stability is important for economic reasons, as inflation damages the 
                                                             
13   Ordo-liberalism is then in first instance a "functionalist" approach, in which first the functions have to be defined.  The 
elaboration of institutions should be related to the function which has to be fulfilled (von der Groeben, 1995, 270).   
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steering function of the price mechanism and creates uncertainty, which hurts investment.  
It is also important for social reasons, as inflation causes a redistribution of income, to the 
disadvantage of t he weaker groups who cannot protect themselves.  Memories of this 
were still vivid in Germany, with the hyperinflation of the 1920s.  The task of ensuring 
monetary stability  became the responsibility of  the, independent, Bundesbank
14.  
Moreover, this goes along with the German "federalist" tradition of preferring decentralised 
and compartmentalised structures (Tietmeyer, 1999, 165). 
 
The more Keynesian tendency in Germany, with Karl Schiller as an important 
representative, put more emphasis on active government policies.  Schiller's ideal of 
economic policy was to combine the market economy (the "Freiburg imperative") with 
active macroeconomic policies (the "Keynesian message").  This tendency was influential 
at the end of the 1960s and the early 1970s, when the social democrats participated in the 
government, with Willy Brandt as their leader and with Schiller as economics minister.  
This group had also links with the trade unions and favoured a dialogue ("konzertierte 
Aktion") between the social partners, trade unions and employers, as an element of their 
economic strategy. 
 
The "decentralist", federalist German philosophy went along with a positive view towards 
European integration and the transfer of sovereignty to supranational European 
institutions.  Moreover, foreign policy was dominated by the belief that European security 
and Franco-German reconciliation was the most vital of all interests for Germany.  In line 
with the federalist concept of "checks and balances", German policy-makers insisted on 
strengthening the role of the European parliament. 
 
3.  THE CREATION OF THE COMMUNITIES 
 
3.1.  The Rome Treaties 
 
The real start of the process of European integration can be traced back to the Schuman 
Declaration of May 1950, which provided the basis for the European Coal and Steel 
Community.  The Declaration stated clearly that: "The solidarity in production will make it 
plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but 
materially impossible ... this proposal will build the first concrete foundation of a European 
federation which is indispensable to the preservation of peace". 
                                                             
14  During the discussions on the Bundesbank law of 1957, Erhard supported the independence of the Bundesbank, while 
Adenauer, initially, was not so much in favour (Marsh, 1992, 167, see also Bibow, 2002 and Bundesbank, 1998).  
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In October 1950 a new French plan followed, the Pleven Plan, which aimed to establish a 
European Defence Community (Vanthoor, 1999).  However, it was defeated in the French 
Assembly in August 1954 by a coalition of Gaullists and Communists.  It showed that 
defence was too close to national sovereignty to be transferred to the European level.  
European integration could only make progress along less sensitive economic lines.  New 
negotiations followed, initiated by the Benelux countries, leading to the Rome Treaties and 
the creation of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy 
Community in January 1958. 
 
In Germany, for Adenauer, the Chancellor, and Hallstein, his influential State Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, foreign policy objectives, in casu the status of the Federal Republic in 
Europe, were of fundamental importance.  Franco-German reconciliation was at the heart 
of their foreign policy (Küsters, 1998, 62).  The formal recognition of the Federal Republic 
of Germany as a sovereign state in May 1955 marked an important step.  It also increased 
the margin of manoeuvre for Germany.  One of Germany's leading negotiators, 
von der Groeben, later remarked: "In the negotiations on the EEC the Federal Republic for 
the first time participated as a free and equal partner" (von der Groeben, 1979, 496).  
Erhard, the Economics Minister, was against the European common market.  He feared 
that a European customs  union would hinder a world-wide liberalisation of trade.  
However, Adenauer overrode his objections
15. 
 
For the German government the new European economic system to be created was of 
utmost importance.  One of the main German aims was that the European common market 
would have the same economic order as the one in the Federal Republic, based on the 
principles of a market economy and a liberal trade policy.  The Germans feared that 
interactions with more etatist and planified systems, through the common market, could 
imperil the consistency of their own economic system (von der Groeben, 1979, 496). 
 
France was living through the Fourth Republic, characterised by mostly short-lived 
coalition governments and political instability.  A very sensitive political issue was 
decolonisation, with Indochina and Algeria.  Also, France's economic position was 
vulnerable.  The French government was divided on the issue of European integration.  
However, the prime minister, Guy Mollet, and the minister for foreign affairs, Christian 
Pineau, were in favour.  Among French pro-European policy-makers, Monnet was very 
                                                             
15   Initially, Adenauer was not so much in favour of the common market as he feared it could complicate negotiations on the 
EDC.  
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influential.  He lobbied for a further push towards European integration along sectoral lines, 
focusing on transport and energy (Monnet, 1976).  However, it was clearly in France that 
resistance against new initiatives at European integration was the strongest.  This was 
both for political reasons (the aversion against supranational institutions, especially, but 
not only, among the Gaullists) and for economic reasons (fear, both from businessmen 
and trade unionists, for German competition, which could endanger France's industry and 
the "acquis social"). 
 
During the negotiations, the French government was in first instance concerned about the 
Euratom Treaty
16.  At some point, it even considered postponing the negotiations for the 
common market.  The French also favoured a greater role for the State in economic life.  In 
a Memorandum the French government proposed the idea of planning on a European 
scale: "A policy of expansion ... implies investment which, in the basic industries, in the 
chemicals industry, in many of the processing industries, rests on a precise conception of 
the targets to be assigned to production over a period of several years.  Convergence of 
the different national economic policies can therefore be ensured only by reconciling and 
harmonising national production objectives." (as quoted in Marjolin, 1986, 287). 
 
Moreover, the French government was very concerned that France was not in a position to 
engage in competition on equal terms.  It was therefore in favour of harmonisation of 
legislation which affected the competitive position, especially social legislation.  The 
French argued further that agriculture had to be included in the common market and that 
France had extra costs, due to her responsibilities in her overseas territories. 
 
Looking then at the Rome Treaties from an economic thought perspective, the European 
Atomic Energy Community, bears a heavier French imprint, with its sectoral approach, 
while the European Economic Community, with the abolition of barriers which hindered the 
free movement of goods, services, labour and capital in the common market and strong 
emphasis on competition policy, has a stronger German sounding
17.    The chapter on 
competition policy (articles 85 to 94) is very comprehensive.  It covers: (1) cartels and 
other private arrangements, as well as the abuse of economic power; (2) distortions of 
competition caused by state subsidies or measures to the same effect; and (3) distortions 
of competition which are based on differences in the legal or administrative regulations of 
the various member states (like technical barriers or tax regulations).   As von der Groeben 
                                                             
16  The negotiators for Euratom received even a higher travel allowance. 
17  Free movement of capital was more limited, under French pressure.  
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noted: "The co-ordination of individual planning decisions through the market occurs 
therefore in all member states within the same legally binding framework consisting of far-
reaching guarantees of private property, freedom to establish a business, the 
determination of prices by supply and demand, freedom to exercise a profession, and free 
access to any market." (von der Groeben, 1979, 497).  The French obtained the setting-up 
of the common agricultural policy  and the association of the overseas territories.  The 
social chapter was rather limited.  One of the surviving elements of the French demands 
was the equality of pay for men and women. 
 
The EEC Treaty was rather sketchy on macroeconomic and monetary issues.  It left 
macroeconomic policy-making mainly at the level of the Member States.  The 
responsibilities of the Commission were rather limited, they concerned mainly the 
orientation and co-ordination of the national macroeconomic policies.  Also, the Treaty 
provided for the creation of the Monetary Committee.  
 
3.2.  The organisation of the Commission of the EEC 
 
The first organigramme of the Commission was of a rather amazing simplicity and 
reflected very well the structure of the EEC Treaty.  The services of the Commission were 
initially composed of nine directorate-generals (departments), giving a good overview of 
the activities of the EEC.  They were: External Relations, Economic and Financial Affairs 
(the macroeconomic research department), Internal Market, Competition, Social Affairs, 
Agriculture, Transport, Overseas Countries and Territories, and Administration.  There was 
also the powerful Secretariat (with responsibility for the co-ordination of activities and the 
preparation of the meetings of the Commission). 
 
In the attribution of the responsibilities of the members of the Commission and the director-
generals (the highest civil servants) one can observe the preoccupations and sensitivities 
of France and Germany.  Louis Armand, a Frenchman, was the first president of the 
Commission of the EAEC.  Walter Hallstein, a German, was the first president of the 
Commission of the EEC, while the Secretary-General, Noël, was French
18. 
 
                                                             
18  Naturally, there was also an element of "chance" in these attributions.  So was initially foreseen that the Belgian foreign 
minister P.H. Spaak, one of the driving figures behind the EEC negotiations, would become the first president of the EEC 
Commission.  
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Table 1 - The first Commission of the European Economic Community 
 
Responsibility  Member of the 
Commission 
Director-General 
Presidency (Secretariat - General)  Hallstein (D)
  Noël (F) 
Economic and Financial Affairs  Marjolin
a (F)  Bobba (I) 
Competition  von der Groeben (D)  Verloren van Themaat (N) 
Internal Market  Malvestiti
a (I)  Ortoli (F) 
Agriculture  Mansholt
a (N)  Rabot (F) 
Overseas Countries and Territories  Lemaignen (F)  Allardt (D) 
External Affairs  Rey (B)  Seeliger (D) 
Social Affairs  Petrilli (I)  de Muyinck (B) 
Transport  Rasquin (L)  Renzetti (I) 
a   Vice - President 
Sources: Commission, 1958 and Lemaignen, 1964, 65. 
 
There was also a Franco-German balance in economic policy attributions.  The French 
had the lead in macroeconomic policy, as Robert Marjolin became responsible for 
Economic and Financial Affairs.  The Germans had the, for them, crucial portfolio of 
competition policy, with Hans von der Groeben. 
 
The Germans further secured their presence in external relations with the director-generals 
for External Relations and Overseas Countries and Territories (Seeliger and Allardt).  
Moreover, they were pleased with Jean Rey at foreign relations.  As von der Groeben 
(1998, 106) later remarked, "we could more readily expect him, a liberal politician, to have 
an appreciation of a worldwide and liberal trade policy". 
 
Also the French obtained some key positions in for them sensitive areas.  Lemaignen 
became the member of the Commission responsible for Overseas Countries and 
Territories, while Ortoli and Rabot became director-general for, respectively, Internal 
Market and Agriculture.  The French were also quite happy with Mansholt as the member 
of the Commission responsible for agriculture: he had been a Dutch Minister for agriculture 
for many years, knew perfectly the mechanics of the farm sector and was convinced of the 
need for a common European agricultural policy (Marjolin, 1986, 313). 
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4.  EMU APPEARS ON THE SCENE 
 
4.1.  The Hague summit and the Werner plan 
 
During the 1960s the common market project, with the abolition of tariffs and quota's, was 
realised.  However, no important new attempts at European integration were undertaken, 
mainly due to Gaullist resistance.  Changes appeared at the end of the 1960s, when the 
customs union was being completed and the unease with the Bretton-Woods system was 
growing. 
 
French interest in European monetary integration can, in first instance, be situated in the 
discussions about the future of the international monetary system (de Lattre, 1999).  De 
Gaulle had always been critical of the central position of the American dollar in the 
Bretton-Woods system.  During the second half of the 1960s, French officials, in order to 
attain a more equilibrated international monetary system, developed ideas about a 
"European monetary identity" (Haberer, 1981).  However, this concept  remained rather 
vague.  Elements were a type of exchange rate mechanism, to keep European currencies 
closer together, and a common position of the Community in international institutions like, 
the IMF
19. 
 
At the end of the 1960s, doubts about the future of the fixed exchange rate system 
became widespread, especially with the devaluation of the French franc in 1969 and the 
vulnerable position of the American dollar.  The countries of the Community feared that 
further exchange rate instability would lead to the disintegration of the customs union and 
the demise of the common agricultural policy.  As a response, the European Commission 
elaborated a Memorandum on the coordination of economic policy and the creation of a 
Community mechanism for monetary cooperation, also known as the "Barre Plan" 
(Commission of the EEC, 1969). 
 
A further crucial factor was that new political leaders had come to power.  In 1969 de 
Gaulle resigned and Pompidou was elected in France.  He and his finance minister, 
Giscard d'Estaing, were more pro-European.  The other major event was the formation of 
a new government in Germany by the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats with 
Willy Brandt as chancellor, a pragmatic but convinced pro-European (Wilkens, 2001).  The 
Brandt government proposed the EMU project.  Foreign policy motives were crucial.  
                                                             
19   This contrasted with German analyses of the Bretton-Woods system, which focused on the threat that intervention 
obligations posed for their domestic objective of price stability (Emminger, 1977, 53)  
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Germany wanted to demonstrate its European credentials, also as a way to 
counterbalance its new Ostpolitik (recognition of the German Democratic Republic).  As 
with the common market project, the technical experts, were more cautious
20. 
 
At the Hague Summit of December 1969, the Heads of State and Government agreed on 
economic and monetary union as an objective of the European Community.  A committee, 
chaired by the Luxembourg Prime Mminister Pierre Werner, produced a report for the 
establishment in stages of an economic and monetary union by 1980 (Council-
Commission of the European Communities, 1970, commonly known as the Werner 
Report)
21. 
 
The Werner Report first presented a general picture of economic and monetary union.  
EMU implied that "the  principal decisions of economic policy will be taken at Community 
level and therefore that the necessary powers will be transferred from the national plane to 
the Community plane" (Werner Report, 26).  The Report proposed that two new 
Community institutions should be created: a centre of decision-making for economic policy 
and a Community system for the central banks.  These transfers of responsibility and the 
creation of the new Community institutions would entail the progressive development of 
political cooperation and it appeared that EMU would be "a leaven for the development of 
political union, which in the long run it will be unable to do without" (Werner Report, 26). 
 
However, the Report did not elaborate very much on the institutional structure of EMU and 
did not distinguish clearly between a single currency and a system of irrevocably fixed 
exchange rates (Baer and Padoa-Schioppa, 1988, 54).  An important reason herefore 
were Franco-German divergencies on the conception of economic policy and European 
integration (Achard, 2002)
22.  
 
The Report considered that economic and monetary union could be achieved in the next 
ten years, "provided the political will of the Member States to realize this objective, 
solemnly declared at the Conference at The Hague, is present" (Werner Report, 14).  It 
proposed a plan to attain EMU in three stages.  However, it did not lay down a precise 
                                                             
20  This would be a constant element in the history of European monetary integration.  The different initiatives came from the 
heads of state (Brandt-Pompidou, Schmidt-Giscard and Kohl-Mitterrand), and "the schemes got a tough reception 
among the experts" (Hoffmeyer, 2000, 14). 
21   Belgium played an important role in this process.  So went Gaston Eyskens, the Belgian prime minister to the Hague with 
a concrete plan for EMU.  Later on, Belgium played further a pace-setting role in the EMU process, cf. Smets, Michielsen 
and Maes, 2002.  
22   So could Bernard Clappier, the French member of the Committee, not accept anything on the  institutional level 
(Bloch-Lainé, 2002).  However, in practice, he proved to be very independent-minded (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999, 
107).  
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timetable for the different stages.  Rather it wanted to maintain a measure of flexibility, 
while concentrating on the first phase.  
 
It proposed that the first stage should commence on 1 January 1971 and cover a period of 
three years.  The main elements were: (a) reinforcement of procedures for consultation 
and policy co-ordination; (b) further liberalisation of intra-Community capital movements 
and steps towards an integrated European capital market; (c) narrowing of exchange rate 
fluctuations between Community currencies (creation of the "snake"). 
 
In the Werner Committee, there were heated discussions about the priorities on the path to 
EMU.  It would lead to the classic description of the debate between the "monetarists" and 
the "economists".  The "economists", led by Germany, emphasised policy co-ordination, 
while the "monetarists", with France, argued for priority for the narrowing of exchange rate 
fluctuations (Werner, 1991).  The compromise solution was that there had to be "parallel 
progress" in both areas
23. 
 
Immediately after its publication, the Werner Report was heavily criticised by the orthodox 
gaullists in France (Tsoukalis, 1977, 104).  Their criticism centred on the supranational 
elements of the Report.  It induced a change in the policy of the French government, 
contributing to a dilution of the proposals of the Report
24.  In particular, the creation of new 
Community institutions was dropped. 
 
The first attempt at monetary unification was not very successful: the "snake" was quickly 
reduced to a German mark-zone and policy coordination remained limited.  This was not 
only due to the unstable international environment (the collapse of the Bretton-Woods 
system and the oil crisis), but also because national governments were still strongly 
attached to their monetary sovereignty and the pursuit of national economic objectives, 
herein comforted by the then influential theory of the Phillips curve (Maes, 2002).  In 
Germany, priority was given to the fight against inflation, while in France economic growth 
was considered a more important objective. 
                                                             
23  According to Tietmeyer (1971, 187), who was the German alternate, the principle of "effective parallelism" comprised at 
least three aspects: (1) between economic policy convergence and closer monetary ties; (2) between currency ties and 
the transfer of responsibility for economic policy to the Community level; and (3) between the building up of Community 
authority and an extension of the responsibilities of Community institutions. 
24  For an analysis of the attitude of Pompidou towards EMU, see Bernard, 1999.  
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Chart 2 - inflation in France and Germany 
 
 
 
Fundamentally, this first attempt at monetary union failed because of different views in 
France and Germany, both on Europe, especially a French refusal to transfer sovereignty 
to supranational European institutions, and regarding economic policy conceptions, more 
stability-oriented policies in Germany and more activist economic policies in France. 
 
4.2.  The European Monetary System 
 
In the second half of the 1970s, European leaders became increasingly worried about the 
stagnation of the European integration process and the ensuing risk that the achievements 
of the past could fall apart.  Roy Jenkins, the president of the European Commission, tried 
to revive the monetary union project, especially in his Florence speech (Jenkins, 1977).  
The following year, the French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and the German 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt played a crucial role in the relaunching of the monetary 
integration process with the creation of the European Monetary System (Ludlow, 1982).  
 
The European Monetary System was launched against considerable scepticism, especially 
from academic economists but also from monetary experts.  However, political leaders 
succeeded in getting it off the ground: "a victory of political intuition over expert opinion" 
(Mortensen, 1990, 28).  
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The European Monetary System was a less ambitious project than the earlier attempt at 
monetary union.  The conclusions of the Bremen Council (July 1978) did not mention 
economic and monetary union but a "scheme for the creation of closer monetary 
co-operation leading to a zone of monetary stability in Europe".  The more limited 
objectives of the EMS were also reflected in the legal form  of the exchange rate 
mechanism: an agreement between the central banks of the Community.   
 
Monetary stability, the objective of the EMS, had a double dimension: internal and 
external.  This was a compromise and synthesis between the ideas of the "monetarists", 
led by France, emphasising the importance of external stability (exchange rate stability) 
and of the "economists", led by Germany, advocating internal stability (price stability) and 
the co-ordination of economic policy. 
 
The first years of the European Monetary System were very difficult, characterised by 
several realignments, a lack of convergence of economic performance and a weak 
co-ordination of economic policy.  Even the European Commission was pessimistic.  It 
noted that the two realignments  of 1982 "give serious cause for concern, since the 
frequency and the size of the adjustments threaten a gradual erosion of the system's 
credibility" (CEC, 1982, 35). 
 
The year 1983 can be considered a turning point in the European Monetary System, 
especially in the relationship between the French franc and the German mark. 
 
In May 1981 François Mitterrand became the first socialist president of the Fifth Republic 
in France.  He started with a strong activist economic program, including an expansionary 
budgetary policy and nationalisations (Sachs and Wyplosz, 1986).  This reinforced the 
divergences in policy preferences between France and Germany.  The ensuing loss of 
competitiveness of the French economy, and capital outflows, repeatedly put strong 
pressure  on the French franc, leading to increases in interest rates and several 
devaluations. 
 
Faced with renewed heavy pressure on the French franc in March 1983, Mitterrand 
realised that this could not continue.  He opted for staying in the EMS, mainly for European  
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reasons.  This implied that, in order to avoid further devaluations of the French franc, he 
had to pursue a more orthodox economic policy, the "politique de rigueur"
25.   
 
4.3.  A growing consensus on stability oriented policies  
 
The oil shock of 1973, and the ensuing stagflation, were of fundamental importance to 
induce changes in the conceptions of French economic policy-makers.  They showed very 
clearly the openness of the French economy and the vulnerability to external 
developments (Patat, 1992, 8).  The oil shock was a, more or less fatal, blow to the French 
planning experience.  French policy-makers became more and more aware that there were 
limits to activist policies, and that France had to take into account the external constraint. 
 
During the second half of the 1970s, under the prime ministership of Raymond Barre, 
French economic policies became more stability-oriented (Albert, 1982, 115)
26.  The 
exchange rate was a crucial element in the strategy to instill discipline on the French 
economy.  Barre also pushed through measures to liberalise prices.  This reorientation of 
French economic policy was an important element why German policy-makers consented 
to the creation of the EMS.  Mitterrand's initial economic policies can then be considered 
as a last gasp of the traditional French interventionist policies, running against the external 
constraint. 
 
These changes in economic policy conceptions were also supported by new economic 
theories.  The “Monetarist counter-revolution” had questioned the Keynesian framework.  It 
led to thrilling debates, initially mainly in the academic world.  In a first stage, discussions 
centred on the determination of nominal demand, monetarists emphasising the money 
supply and not budgetary policy, as the main determinant of effective demand.  In a 
second stage, the attention shifted towards the functioning of the labour market, with the 
monetarists attacking the Phillips curve (Friedman, 1968).  With the rational expectations 
hypothesis, the possibilities of policy-makers to steer the economy were even more 
strongly questioned, as economic agents react to changes in policy (Lucas, 1976).  The 
literature on time-inconsistency pointed further to the inflationary bias of a discretionary 
monetary policy (Barro and Gordon, 1983).  To retain flexibility, while dealing with the 
inflationary bias of a discretionary policy, central bank independence quickly topped the 
                                                             
25   So changed the Mauroy government the wage-setting procedures, including the abolishment of automatic wage 
indexation. 
26   Raymond Barre was originally a prominent academic and scholar (including a knowledge of German ordo-liberalism, cf. 
Barre, 1952).  As a Vice-president of the European Commission, from 1967 to 1972, he got first hand knowledge of 
differences in the French and German economic policy conceptions (Barre, 2000, 19).  
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research agenda (Fischer, 1994).  Moreover, empirical studies indicated that central bank 
independence went together with a better economic performance (Grilli, Masciandaro and 
Tabellini, 1991).  Central bank independence became so not only a key theme of German 
ordo-liberalism, but also an important element of mainstream Anglo-Saxon economics. 
 
The expansion and the growing importance of the financial markets also reinforced the 
position of the central banks.  This was especially so in France, where the Treasury had 
the final say on monetary policy.  However, with the growth of the financial markets, the 
position of the Banque de France vis-à-vis the Treasury was strengthened, due to its 
technical expertise and its knowledge and experience of the markets. 
 
Gradually then a consensus developed, moving away from active demand management 
policies and towards a medium-term orientation, emphasising structural, supply-side 
oriented policies
27.  A core ingredient of this new strategy was that monetary policy should 
be geared to price stability, and conducted by an independent central bank.   
 
Multilateral fora, like the European Union, the OECD, the BIS, and the IMF, greatly 
contributed to the dissemination of these new ideas on stability oriented policies
28.   Senior 
French and German officials would meet often, not only bilaterally, but also in these 
international fora.  This contributed to a growing consensus, also among French economic 
policy-makers, on "sound money" policies.  An important illustration is Jacques de 
Larosière, the Governor of the Banque de France from 1987 to 1993, who, previously, had 
been Managing Director of the IMF.   
 
                                                             
27  With the Thatcher government, a new tendency to privatisation started in Europe.  In France, when Mitterrand came to 
power, he implemented a large scale nationalisation programme.  Privatisations began in France during the first 
"cohabitation", with Balladur as finance minister. 
28  For an overview of the evolution of ideas at the European Commission, see Maes, 1998.  
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5.  THE MAASTRICHT TREATY PROCESS 
 
5.1.  The relaunching of the monetary union project 
 
Meanwhile, in 1985, the process of European integration was relaunched with the internal 
market programme.  With the Single European Act of 1987, economic and monetary union 
was for the first time mentioned in the Treaties. 
 
A crucial element of the internal market programme was the liberalisation of capital 
movements, for which also Delors had been pushing.  This was having consequences in 
the monetary field, as the liberalisation of capital movements was a crucial German 
condition for progress on monetary cooperation.  Moreover, central bankers and finance 
ministry officials were more and more confronted with the so-called "impossible triangle", 
indicating that it is impossible to have free capital movement, fixed exchange rates and an 
autonomous monetary policy at the same time.  During the 1980s and early 1990s capital 
mobility increased enormously.  With stable exchange rates in the EMS, there was no 
longer much room for an autonomous monetary policy, except in the anchor country.  The 
European Community therefore had to live with the disadvantages of monetary union, 
while enjoying few of its advantages. 
 
Table 2 - Cross-border transactions in bonds and equities
1 
 
  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  1998 
             
Germany  5  7  33  57  172  334 
             
France  -  5  21  54  187  415 
             
Italy  1  1  4  27  253  640 
             
Source: BIS.
 
1  Gross purchases and sales of securities between residents and non-residents, as a 
percentage of GDP. 
 
Moreover, also after the decision of March 1983 to opt for the EMS, France remained 
unhappy with the German dominance in the System.  During Franco-German negotiations, 
Jacques Attali even called the German mark the "force de frappe allemande".  
 
In early 1988, debates about Europe's monetary future accelerated.  In a memorandum of 
January 1988, the French Finance Minister, Edouard Balladur, argued that the exchange  
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rate mechanism still had some important defects, notably its asymmetry
29.  Balladur 
criticized the German dominance of the system: "Il faut éviter qu'un seul pays ait, de fait, la 
responsabilité de fixer les objectifs de politique économique et monétaire de l'ensemble du 
système" (Balladur, 1988, 19). 
 
Although, the Balladur Memorandum focused on adapting the way in which the EMS 
functioned, it also argued that it was necessary to reflect on further institutional steps in the 
monetary construction of Europe.  With the liberalisation of capital movements and the 
internal market, an integrated economic area would be created.  It concluded by raising the 
issue of the creation of a single currency (Balladur, 1988, 20). 
 
Balladur's Memorandum found a perceptive ear in Germany, not at the Bundesbank or the 
Finance Ministry (see Stoltenberg, 1988), but at the Foreign Ministry.  Several factors 
converged in making economic and monetary union a key theme for Genscher (Smets, 
Maes and Michielsen, 2000, 67): (1) it fitted in perfectly with Genscher's pro-European 
convictions.  Genscher wanted to strengthen the process of European integration, which 
he considered as still fragile after the Euro-sclerosis of the first half of the 1980s.  
Moreover he sensed that, with Gorbachev, things were changing in the East; (2) it was a 
popular theme among the business community i n Germany, a natural constituency of 
Genscher's liberal democratic party; (3) Genscher was also influenced by French 
complaints about the German dominance of the EMS and wanted to do something about 
this
30.  The German Presidency of the Council of Ministers, in the first half of 1988, offered 
just such an opportunity (Schönfelder & Thiel, 1996, 29).  In February 1988, Genscher, in 
his personal capacity, published a Memorandum wherein he argued strongly for a 
European Monetary Union and a European Central Bank (Genscher, 1988). 
 
At that time, early in 1987, Helmut Kohl was still quite open to the issue of monetary union.  
On the one hand, he was sensitive to the arguments of Stoltenberg that EMU was only 
possible if a sufficient degree of convergence was achieved (coronation theory).  On the 
other hand, he was also sensitive to the arguments of the advocates of EMU (like 
Genscher), but also Mitterrand, for whom he had a high esteem and who often complained 
about the asymmetry of the EMS.  Moreover, Kohl gradually realised that EMU was 
                                                             
29  Asymmetry was probably the most important theme in the Franco-German discussions about the different exchange rate 
regimes and proposals in the 1970s and 1980s. In essence, it revolved around the issue of which country had to make 
policy adjustments in order to preserve the stability of the exchange rate.  This topic falls however outside the scope of 
this paper. 
30   Germany was confronted with the issue of the "political sustainability" of the EMS: could the stance of monetary policy be 
determined by one country, in a Community, where, in principle, decisions are taken together.   
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unavoidable if he wanted to realise his vision of a "United States of Europe", a recurrent 
theme in his speeches at that time.  Of crucial importance was the Franco-German 
bilateral summit at Evian, early in June 1988, when Kohl and Mitterrand decided to push 
ahead with EMU. 
 
Important progress was further made at the Hanover Summit in June 1988.  The European 
Council confirmed the objective of economic and monetary union and decided to entrust to 
a Committee the task of studying and proposing concrete stages leading towards this 
union
31.  The Committee was chaired by Jacques Delors, who had the confidence of Kohl 
and Mitterrand, and, as a former finance minister, the technical expertise.  The governors 
of the central banks - in a personal capacity - were also on the Committee.  Delors wanted 
them to be members, both because of their expertise and because this would bind them to 
the monetary union project.  In a first reaction, Karl-Otto Pöhl, the president of the 
Bundesbank, even considered refusing to serve on the Committee (Pöhl, 1996, 196).  The 
Committee produced its report for the June 1989 meeting of the European Council 
(Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, 1989, hereafter referred to as 
the Delors Report). 
 
5.2.  The Delors Report 
 
The Delors Report would assume a crucial role as a reference and anchor point in further 
discussions, just as the Werner Report nearly two decades earlier.  The Delors Report 
basically revolved around two issues: first, which economic arrangements are necessary 
for a monetary union to be successful?  Second, which gradual path should be designed to 
reach economic and monetary union? 
 
Initially, the relation between Delors and Pöhl in the Committee was rather tense.  
However, the crucial aim of Delors was to get a unanimous Report.  So he took a low 
profile and focused on seeking out consensus in the Committee.  
 
Karl-Otto Pöhl took a "fundamentalist" position and emphasised the new monetary order 
which had to be created: "Above all agreement must exist that stability of the value of 
money is the indispensable prerequisite for the achievement of other goals.  Particular 
importance will therefore attach to the principles on which a European monetary order 
should be based" (Pöhl, 1988, 132).  He argued for price stability as the prime objective of 
                                                             
31  This was a very shrewd limitation of the mandate of the Committee.  It was not asked to analyse whether EMU was 
desirable or not, only to work out the path to reach EMU.  
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monetary policy, which had to be conducted by an independent central bank.  Pöhl further 
emphasised the "indivisibility of monetary policy", that decisions should be taken either at 
the national level or by a common central bank.   
 
The fundamentalist approach would be deeply influential in the Delors Report and inspire a 
number of principles that would figure prominently in the Maastricht Treaty 
(Padoa-Schioppa, 1994, 9).  The Delors Committee took great care to work out first the 
view on the final stage of EMU, a major, and very fundamental, contrast to the Werner 
Committee, which was deeply divided on this issue.  The Delors Report proposed, at the 
institutional level, the creation of an independent "European System of Central Banks", 
which would be responsible for the single monetary policy, with price stability as the 
ultimate aim.  In the discussions on the independence of the central bank, one of the most 
delicate issues, Pöhl received valuable support from de Larosière, for whom the Delors 
Committee presented also an opportunity to increase the independence of the Banque de 
France (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999, 345)
32. 
 
The Delors Report also provided a characterisation of economic union (Delors Report, 20): 
(a) the single market within which persons, goods, services and capital can move freely; 
(b) competition policy and other measures aimed at strengthening market mechanisms; (c) 
common policies aimed at structural change and regional development;  (d) 
macroeconomic policy co-ordination, including binding rules for budgetary policies. 
 
To attain economic and monetary union the Delors Committee proposed three stages.  
However, the Committee underlined the indivisibility of the whole process: "the decision to 
enter upon the first stage should be a decision to embark on the entire process" (Delors 
Report, 31).  The three stages were, in contrast to the emphasis on the first stage in the 
Werner Report, all worked out in considerable detail.   
 
One of the most controversial issues in the Committee was the proposal of de Larosière to 
create a European Reserve Fund (de Larosière, 1988).  The idea was that a European 
Reserve Fund could be a possible initial step on the path to EMU.  It would function as a 
training ground process and as a monetary "think-tank".  One of its functions could be 
interventions in the foreign exchange markets.  
 
                                                             
32  In order to cover himself politically, de Larosière had a meeting with Mitterrand, in which Mitterrand did not object to 
central bank independence.  
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This proposal of de Larosière was in line with the classic French ideas of strengthening 
support mechanisms for weak currency countries.  It also reflected the French emphasis 
on the building of institutions.  However, for de Larosière tactical elements, especially his 
position with regard to the French Treasury, played also a role.  It was an issue on which 
no consensus could be reached (Delors Report, 36).  According to Hoffmeyer (2000, 72), it 
was probably backed by a majority, but it ran counter to the German indivisibility 
philosophy. 
 
The Delors Report also implied that an agenda had been set which was contrary to the 
view of Mrs. Thatcher.  The British government responded with some rather "belated 
alternatives": the competing currency and the hard ecu plans (Dyson and Featherstone, 
1999, 612).  They were both based on a market-led approach.  Both sets of proposals 
failed  miserably.  A first problem was naturally the perception that the Thatcher 
government wanted to obstruct the path to EMU.  Also, the Delors Committee, with the 
powerful central bankers, had already rejected the basic principles of the British 
alternatives and had made a clear choice for a single currency.  Moreover, the British 
alternatives, and the rejection of them by Germany, brought clearly to the foreground, the 
fundamental difference between the British and the German economic policy paradigms.  It 
showed to French policy-makers, that, for Germany, monetary stability was a political issue 
of the highest level and not something to be left to the market. 
 
However, there remained important differences between France and Germany.  For Kohl, 
in line with Adenauer, the ultimate goal of European cooperation was political union.  He 
accepted that EMU was a necessary element of political union and might even contribute 
to it, but it was not an end in itself.   For Mitterrand, what mattered was that monetary 
policy should be a common undertaking. 
 
5.3.  The Maastricht Treaty 
 
The period 1989-1990 was characterised by some of the most dramatic political changes 
in Europe since the end of the Second World War.  With the fall of the Berlin Wall on 
November 1989, the issue of German unification came suddenly to the forefront.  The 
German governmernt's policy line could almost be summarised in Thomas Mann's dictum: 
"Wir wollen ein europäisches Deutschland und kein deutsches Europa". 
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In this context, the EMU process accelerated.  At the Strasbourg Summit of December 
1989 the date for the IGC was fixed.  Furthermore, Mitterrand increasingly turned in favour 
of greater political integration.  In April 1990 Kohl and Mitterrand formulated a common 
letter, suggesting a parallel IGC on political union. 
 
Both IGC's started in Rome in December 1990.  However, the IGC on political union was 
less well prepared.  Moreover, the old German and French conceptions of European 
integration quickly came to the surface.  Germany was in favour of a more supranational 
European Union, with, especially, a stronger role for the European Parliament.  It was also 
in favour of more European cooperation in the area of foreign and security policy.  France 
preferred an intergovernmental model, with a greater role for the Council. 
 
The Maastricht Treaty created a so-called European Union, based on three pillars.  The 
first pillar had at its core the old Community, but with greatly extended responsibilities, 
especially economic and monetary union.  The second pillar was for foreign and security 
policy.  The third one concerned co-operation on such topics as immigration, asylum and 
police.  These last two pillars were more intergovernmental, with a limited role for the 
supranational European institutions, like the Commission and the European Parliament.  
The Treaty also strengthened the powers of the European Parliament. 
 
Economic and monetary union had an asymmetrical structure
33.  Monetary policy was 
centralised.  It was the responsibility of the European System of Central Banks, composed 
of the European Central Bank and the national central banks, which are all independent.  
The primary objective of monetary policy is price stability.  This part of the Treaty went 
quite smoothly through the intergovernmental conference.  The preparations in the Delors 
Committee, the Committee of Governors and the Monetary Committee certainly 
contributed to this
34.  The prominence of the German institutional model was also evident.  
Several factors contributed to this: the sheer size of Germany and the Deutsche mark; 
strong theoretical support, based on a blend of German ordo-liberal and mainstream 
Anglo-Saxon ideas; the successful history of German monetary policy; the strong 
bargaining position of the German authorities and the unique federal structure of the 
Bundesbank (Rey, 1999). 
 
                                                             
33   The old "economist" versus "monetarist" debates also resurfaced in the discussions on the criteria to be admitted to 
EMU, with Germany insisting on strict "convergence" criteria. 
34   For an analysis of the role of the Monetary Committee, see Kees, 1994.  
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The responsibility for other instruments of economic policy, like budgetary policy and 
structural policies, remained basically decentralised, with the national authorities.  
However, Member States have to regard their economic policies as a matter of common 
concern and co-ordinate them accordingly.  Important elements in this co-ordination 
process are the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, the multilateral surveillance process 
and the excessive deficit procedure.  The different conceptions of monetary union and 
economic union reflect the limits of the willingness of the member states to give up national 
sovereignty (Szász, 1999, 154). 
 
The coordination process for budgetary policy and the responsibility for exchange rate 
policy were the topic of some of the most tense discussions during the intergovernmental 
conference.  The French proposed a "gouvernement économique", whereby the European 
Council would provide for broad orientations for economic policy, including monetary 
policy.  This provoked a strong clash with the Germans, for whom the independence of the 
European Central Bank was not negotiable.  However, the Germans were also convinced 
of the necessity of a coordination of other economic policies, especially budgetary policy, 
as they determine the environment in which monetary policy has to function.  The 
agreement was only reached after intense negotiations, including secret bilateral 
discussions between the French and the Germans. 
 
These discussions showed that the Franco-German controversies touched on the 
"meta-beliefs" concerning the organisation of economic policy: centralised or 
decentralised.  They concerned fundamental issues of a constitutional nature and of 
legitimacy.  For Germany, to agree on the establishment of EMU, "the independence of the 
European Central Bank was  a conditio sine qua non"  (Tietmeyer, 1999, 139, original 
italics). 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
 
There were significant differences in ideas and economic  policy-making in France and 
Germany in t he postwar period.  In Germany, the economic order was based on the 
concept of the social market economy, while in France the government played a greater 
role in economic life and pursued more activist economic policies.  These differences in 
economic thought were to a large extent based on more fundamental underlying 
differences in "meta-beliefs".  The "tradition républicaine" in France stressed the sovereign 
nation as the source of legitimacy and, consequently, the political direction of economic  
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policy.  The postwar German federal system stressed decentralisation and a division of 
power. 
 
These differences in economic ideas between France and Germany contributed to shaping 
the nature and form of the European Communities.  The European Atomic Energy 
Community, advocated by Monnet, bore the signature of the sectoral approach, typical of 
French planning.  The European Economic Community reflected to a large extent German 
ordo-liberal ideas with its emphasis on the abolition of trade barriers and a strong 
competition policy.  
 
There were regular recurrences of these Franco-German debates during the last decades.  
In the beginning the Franco-German debates went to the core of economic policy-making.  
They concerned the basic mechanisms of economic coordination: planning or the market.  
Gradually, however, planning, fell into demise.  Important factors hereby were the 
stagflation of the 1970s and the growing openness of the economies.  Also activist 
Keynesian policies lost support, due to the failure of demand management policies, both at 
the international level, like the coordinated expansion of 1978, and at the national level, 
like the Mitterrand experiment in France in the early 1980s.  Gradually, a consensus 
developed on "sound money" policies: stability oriented, medium-term, economic policies, 
with an emphasis on the supply side.  The ensuing acceptance of price stability as the 
ultimate objective of monetary policy was an important factor behind the remarkable 
convergence of inflation in the 1980s and 1990s,  an indispensable condition for the 
realisation of EMU. 
 
One can discern some interesting parallels between the negotiations for the Rome 
Treaties and the Maastricht Treaty.  The parallels were probably strongest on the German 
side.  In both cases the main technical actor, the Economics Ministry in the 1950s and the 
Bundesbank in the 1980s and 1990s, was cautious about the move towards European 
integration.  However, in both cases the Chancellor overrode the objections of the 
"technicians", because of foreign policy motives, whereby the desire to further the process 
of European integration and to strengthen the Franco-German relationship were important 
elements. 
 
While the German Chancellor in both cases decided to continue with the process of 
European integration, he left his negotiators a large room of manoeuvre as regards the 
kind of European construction to be created.  The Economics Ministry and the  
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Bundesbank were deeply concerned with the new economic order which would be created.  
So took Pöhl a "fundamentalist" approach in the discussions in the Delors Committee.  He 
argued for price stability as the prime objective of monetary policy, which had to be 
conducted by an independent central bank.  This view would permeate the Delors Report 
and the Maastricht Treaty, just as the creation of a competitive market permeated the 
Rome Treaty. 
 
The most difficult discussions during the Maastricht Treaty negotiations concerned the 
French proposal for a "Gouvernement économique".  This went to the core of the French 
and German meta-beliefs concerning the constitutional architecture of EMU, related to the 
division of powers between the different authorities, especially the independence of the 
central bank and the political direction of economic policy.  Basically, the German view 
prevailed, as the transfer of monetary sovereignty to the European Central Bank was only 
acceptable for Germany if the German model was followed. 
 
To conclude, the convergence of French and German economic policy conceptions was an 
indispensable condition for the realisation of EMU.  However, differences still remain.  
France typically tends to favour  a more discretionary approach, while  Germany rather 
emphasises the importance of rules.  The discussions on the creation of the Stability and 
Growth Pact were a typical example of this. 
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LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED† 
 
France 
 
Pierre Achard, Member of the cabinet of R. Barre (23-01-2002) 
 
Michel Albert*, Commissioner General, Planning Office (9-11-2000) 
 
Raymond Barre*, Prime Minister (6-12-2001) 
 
Jean-René Bernard, Advisor to G. Pompidou (2-10-2001) 
 
Jean-Michel Bloch-Lainé, Deputy Director of the Treasury (6-12-2001) 
 
Jacques de Larosière, Director of the Treasury, Governor of the Banque de France 
(3-10-2001) 
 
André de Lattre, Advisor to Ch. de Gaulle, Deputy Governor of the Banque de France 
(23-1-2002) 
 
Jacques Delors*, Finance Minister (13-7-1999) 
 
Hervé Hannoun, Chef de cabinet of P. Bérégovoy (9-2-2000) 
 
Jean-Yves Haberer, Chef de cabinet of M. Debré, Director of the Treasury (3-10-2001) 
 
François-Xavier Ortoli*, Chef de cabinet of G. Pompidou, Finance Minister (4-12-2001) 
 
Jean-Pierre Patat, Director-General, Research and International Relations, Banque de 
France (23-3-2001) 
 
Jean-Claude Paye*, Advisor to R. Barre (23-3-2001) 
 
Jérôme Vignon*, Advisor to J. Delors (8-3-2001) 
 
Germany 
 
Leonhard Gleske*, Member of the Board, Deutsche Bundesbank (18-12-2001) 
 
Günter Grosche, Head of the European Currencies Division, Finance Ministry (27-7-2001) 
 
Otmar Issing, Member of the Board, Deutsche Bundesbank (2-5-2001) 
 
Horst Köhler, State Secretary, Finance Ministry (26-10-1999) 
 
                                                             
†  Main functions relating to the topic of the interview and date of the interview.  The paper also draws on the working 
experience and contacts of the author at the National Bank of Belgium (since October 1983), the Commission of the EC 
(October 1989 - January 1991), the Deutsche Bundesbank (September - October 1993) and in the academic world. 
*  Persons which had positions at both the national and European level.  
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Manfred Lahnstein*, Finance Minister (13-6-2002) 
 
Bernhard Molitor*, Head of the Economic Policy Directorate, Economics Ministry 
(8-3-2001) 
 
Karl-Otto Pöhl, State Secretary, Finance Ministry, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank 
(23-9-1999) 
 
Wilhelm Schönfelder, Head of the Economics Division, Foreign Ministry (12-11-1999) 
 
Hans Tietmeyer, State Secretary, Finance Ministry, President of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank (18-12-2001) 
 
Luxembourg 
 
Pierre Werner, Prime Minister (15-5-1999) 
 
 
European Monetary Institute 
 
Alexandre Lamfalussy (B), President (12-7-1999) 
 
Jean-Jacques Rey (B), Chairman of the Monetary Policy Committee (17-6-1999, 
27-2-2002) 
 
 
Commission of the EC 
 
a)  Members 
 
Raymond Barre* (F), Vice-President, Economic and Financial Affairs (6-12-2001) 
 
Jacques Delors* (F), President (13-7-1999) 
 
François-Xavier Ortoli* (F), President (4-12-2001) 
 
Hans von der Groeben (D), Member, Competition Policy (23-7-2001) 
 
b)  Officials 
 
Jean-Paul Abraham (B), Economist, European Coal and Steel Community (6-6-2000) 
 
Michel Albert* (F), Director DG II (9-11-2000) 
 
Daniel Cardon (B), Chef de cabinet of A. Coppé (15-5-2001) 
 
Roland de Kergorlay (F), Secretary of the Monetary Committee (27-11-2001) 
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Michael Emerson (UK), Member of the cabinet of R. Jenkins, Director DG II (16-6-1997, 
21-5-1999) 
 
Jean Flory (F), Chef de cabinet of R. Marjolin (5-12-2001) 
 
Michele Fratianni (I), Economic Advisor DG II (18-11-1998) 
 
Franz Froschmaier (D), Chef de cabinet of W. Haferkamp (16-7-1997) 
 
Leonhard Gleske* (D), Director DG II (18-12-2001) 
 
Andreas Kees (D), Secretary of the Monetary Committee (28-11-2001) 
 
Manfred Lahnstein* (D), Chef de cabinet of W. Haferkamp (13-06-2002) 
 
André Louw (B), Head of Unit DG II (22-8-1997, 24-7-2001) 
 
Jörgen Mortensen (DK), Head of Unit DG II (23-2-1995, 15-1-1998) 
 
Jean-Claude Morel (F), Deputy Director-General DG II, Director-General Forward Looking 
Studies Unit (17-8-2000, 5-11-2000) 
 
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (I), Director-General DG II (18-6-1999) 
 
Jean-Claude Paye* (F), Chef de cabinet of R. Barre (23-3-2001) 
 
Giovanni Ravasio (I), Director-General DG II (10-4-2002) 
 
Ludwig Schubert (D), Advisor to A. Pfeiffer, Deputy Director-General DG II (25-8-2000, 25-
4-2001) 
 
Umberto Stefani (I), Assistent to the Director-General, DG II (31-10-2001) 
 
Robert Toulemon (F), Chef de cabinet of R. Marjolin (23-1-2002) 
 
Paul van den Bempt (B), Director DG II (5-6-1997) 
 
Jérôme Vignon* (F), Advisor to J. Delors (8-3-2001) 
 
Manfred Wegner (D), Deputy Director-General DG II (2-9-1997)  
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